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Nonday, Dcccnibcr 15th, 1873. 
FIELD ~ L ~ I S I I A L  H.R.H. THE DUKE OF CANDRIDGE, K.G., kc., 
Prcsidcnt of thc Institution, in tlic Chair. 
EXPERIENCE I N  SAVAGE WARFARE. 
By Src SAJIUEL WIIITE BAKEC, Pacha,.XA., F.R.S, F.R.G.S., 
Najor-Gcncrl of tho Ottoman Empire. 
YOUK Royal Dighncss and Gcntlcmcn,-I feel it  is somcmhat prcsump- 
tuous in xnc to on’cr any remarks upon military matters, not having hail 
thc professional education of n military man; but a t  thc same timc, 
I hope yon will undcrstand that I never sought this honour, it has 
bccn prcsscd upon me, and tl!crcforc I appcar bcforc you as a matter of 
duty. 
TO thosc who hnvc studicd the military art as n profcssion, it niay 
appcar a light matter to cnpgc in war against savages armed with tlic 
rude wcnpons of barbarians, and furnishcd with fire-arms of the worst 
construction. Thc Officer I T ~ O  Lns becii cducatcd according to tlic 
rplcs that guidc the movements of Europcan troops, might regard with 
contcmpt an enemy wholly without cducation, wliosc forccs, altliougli 
numcrous, arc apparently devoid of organisation, and rcscmblc at the 
first glauce, the unccrtain surging of n mob. XOIY, in my opinion, thcrc 
cannot bc n grcatcr crror in any commander than contcmpt of liis 
cncmy-savage though l i e  may bc. It is true that in an opcn country 
a handful of disciplined troops is superior toLa host of badly-armed 
savagcs ; but it must be rcnicrnbercd that the nativcs of n barbarous 
country possess ndvantagcs which in some measure compcnsatc thcm 
for their inferiority of weapons, and the lack of mliat we call “ military 
education.” 
The African samgc posscsscs n thorough linowlcdgc of his country: 
From liis cliildliood hc has run naked among the tangled forests 
and gigantic gixsses, tlirougli which he can move with tlie case 
and almost with thc swiftncss of a mild beast. .Like tlic animals of 
his forest, lic sccks covert- a t  tbc first approach of danger, and the 
junglc, \vhich to troops in uniform is almost impcnetmble, is to thc 
nativc warrior n retrcat that shields him from all dangw. Thus when 
the African is opposed to disciplined forccs, lie invariably rclies upon 
thc sccuritynftordcd him by tlic cli5culties of his country. His tactics 
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BSPERIENCC IN SA’nGE WAEFAItI;. 903 
of attack and sudden rctrcat to his thick coverts, are exceedingly 
annoying to regular troops, who cannot overtake so actirc an cncmy. 
There is seldom a chance of forcing him to fight upon x fair open field ; 
thus the nstivcs’ actual loss in action is generally light, and hc is 
accordingly ready to renen- his sudden attack upon the first opportunitj. 
Although not soldiers in our acceptation of the term, it inust bc rc- 
mcmbercd that ercry individual is a warrior. From earliest childhtmd, 
be has been in constant practice Kith the lance and bow. His barbed 
arron-s, frcqucntly poisoned, do fatal service at  a distance of 120 yards. 
I hare mcasurcd these distances, and practised the mcn a t  marks. 
Tlic lauce is throivn wit11 great force and precision up to forty 
yards, and will fall into a body of nien at  sixty y d s .  Thus 
they can throvi. them into a stockade or  fort at  niglit. Thc common 
musket becomes formidable 1%-lien loaded mith slugs and used from 
: nmbuscadcs ; and although all these s a ~ n g e  weapons appcar ridi. 
culous \chcn compared with modern invcntions, it  will be found 
that in the close and cautious fighting of the bush and grass jungles, 
tliesc naked savages arc not to be too carelessly csfimatcd. It 
may be considered, as a i d e ,  that native wnrfaro is conductctl upon 
the principle of “ surprise,” nln-ays allied with trcncherj-. Tllcy will 
cmploy falsc guides or interpreters, who, having gained the confidence 
of their European enemy, will lead the troops into an ambuscade. 
Ewr watchful, the natives spy out the morcmcnts of troops fiom the 
tops of trees in which their dark bodies are invisible in the thick foliage. 
Should n lack of discipline permit, stragglers will assnrcrlly be cut off, 
or sentries be stolen upon, and killed by a lance or arrow in the back. 
The favouritc method of attack in large force, is during the night, when 
the darkness rcduccs the danger from the fire of rifles. On such occa- 
sions, the nativcs generally halt, according to tlie conditions of the 
country, in forest or grass, about half a mile from the camp they pro- 
pose to attack. Scouts arc sent forward to ascertain thc position of 
sentries, bcforo thc advance of the main body. The scouts being quite 
naked, c m d  upon hands and knees until thc darkness has pcrmittcd 
them to approach mithin a fen. p r d s  of the scntrics. They then lie 
flat upon thcir bellies, unobserved, until they can rctrcat to the ex- 
pectant main body in thc rear. According to circurnstanccs, the 
attackjng force now advances in perfect silence, and, approaching upon 
their hands and knccs in the same manncr ns the senuts, they suddcnly 
spring upon the sentries, and with \vild yclls, make x gcncral rush upon 
fhc camp. This suddcn attack \rould bc cstrcmcly dnngcrous nnlcss 
proridcd against ; and in this nianner tliey frcqucntly surprise and 
.massacre every one of a large party of slarc hunters, and destroy thcir 
camp. 
An Officer in command of European troops cngaged in “ saragc war- 
fare” should always bexarc of two great dangers, “ treachery” and 
( L  ~ ~ I p r i s c . ”  The grcntcst a r c  is necessary in patrolling, and the 
strictest discipline must be obsomcd among the sentries. Upon no 
account mhatcvcr should natives (even if friendly) be permitted to 
enter your camp with arms in their hands. The weapons should be 
left allyap outsido the camp in charge of a sentry before a native is 
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906 mrmImcI: 1s SAVAGE WARFARE. 
allowd cntrancc. A farouritc modc of attack is tlins treaclicrously to 
cntcr tlic camp armed, until by dcgrces p suflicicnt forcc has congrc- 
gated, when at  a givcn signal they rush upon the unsuspccting troops. 
I h a ~ e  known a wholc party of slnvc trailcrs killed in this T V ~ J - .  
From this sliort description of the habits of Africans, it \rill bc easily 
unc!crstood that bush-fighting mist  at all timcs bc most unsatisfactory 
to regular troops. They will be hamsscd by fdiguing niarclics in n 
bad climatc. Xight attacks will constantly disturb thcir rcst j men 
mill bc killcd and mounded by unsccn enemies in ambush, and tlicrc 
will not be the satisfaction of a fair stand-up fight in the open, to provc 
the supcriority of tlie troops. From thc’ cxpericiicc of somc pears, I 
find that tlic best plan for carrying on a natim war is to combiiic 
nntirc tactics with the general manccuvres of re,nulars. Tlic iintircs 
never expect that you will attack tlicm on their own principles. Thus, 
ambuscades may be mct with ambuscades, their positions may bc 
cirricd before daybreak by a silent night marc11,~aiid~ a snddcii rush; . 
and arrangements may bc madc for secretly occupying n Inrgc area by 
detached parties of riilcmcn in linc so concealed in grass or  busli, that 
the wily natives must inevitably fall into tlic marc n-hcn endeavouring 
either to reconnoitre or to attack thc position. 
In commencing an African war, thc first consideration is tho outfit 
and tlic arms best adapted for bush-fighting. 
With few exceptions, long range rifles will hnrc Iittlc practice, as thc 
enemy will seldom sliomin thc open. I sliould arm only one company in 
each regiment with rifles ; tlic remaining companies slioulcl carry single 
barrelled breech-loader smooth bores of No. 10 calibrc. Tlic cartridge 
should be long enough to contain a cliargc of six drachms of powder 
with one No. 1G spherical bullct and twenty-four mould shot of the 
sizc known as S.S.G. A short sword-bayonct or broad bladed knifc 
tmelrc inches in length of blade, should fix on this gun as upon tllc 
Government riflcs. Kow this knife slionld be strong and sharp, but 
without tho cross p n r d ,  which is an unnecessary meiglit in tho usc of 
sirord-bayonets. Such knircs ~ o u l d  bc invaluable in camping out 
when it is necessary to clcar a ~ n y  grass from :I camp, or for cutting 
poles for Iiuts, $c. Guns of tlic description I hare named, n-onld be fai- 
preferable to riflcs for fighting in bush or grass jungles. The No. 16 
bullet mould travel through n long rangc, whilc tlic mould shot n-ould 
be effectirc a t  150 yards, and would s\wep the cncniy out of thc covert 
witli \-cry fatal effect. It must bc recollected that oiie ~-01lcy from n 
company will throw about 2,200 shot and ball ; this would be irresis- 
tiblc when delirered into ruasscs of men. Should tlic regiment break 
corert and advance upon open ground, the rifle company mould be 
thrown forward as skirniislicrs. Wlicn in jungle, thc rifles ~vould 
simply protcct tlic rear. Rdckcts arc in-ialuable, especially ‘ thosc 
known as Hale’s tlirec-pounders. These in reality weigh five pounds. 
I n  bush-fighting, tlic object of the rocket w ~ u l d  bc to try the jungle 
before the troops advanced. A forest or a prairic of lligli grass may 
conceal a largc forcc of the enemy that would rush upon the troops 
wlien passing in single file dong n narrow footpath, or attack them on 
flank and rcar. A fw rockets fired into tlic bush a t  a ntlicr 1011- 
’ 
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nn,+>,Aio as to ricoclict, WMC two 01’ tlircc wcrc firc~l at  a long range 
so as to esploilc beyond thc enemy, would assurcdly discovcr them, if 
concealed. A common nativc prncticc is to surround tlic troops lyit11 
firc ~ h c n  marching in thc high dry grass in the summcr season. TJlis 
is esceehgly dangerous sliodd thc wind bc high, a t  mhich time tllc 
flames mill travel n t  about sis niilcs an hour. This I harc also proyc(1, 
because in American accounts of firing tho pixiric, tlicrc is nc gcatcr  
exaggcration than what is stated as to the spccd at ~i-bicli tho fire 
travels. Wc hare sccn pictures of cattle and liorscs galloping a t  full 
speed, and yet the fire overtaking them. It is perfect nonsense. I 
linve walkcd before thc firc in a high mind, and l~avc also run before 
thc fire in a.frcsh gnlc of wind, but I bavc ncrcr sccn it travelling 
at  o grcatcr spccd than six miles an hour. Thcrcforc, if troops sllould 
bc surrounded by fire, and do not lose .their prcscncc of mind, wliicli 
men most likely will under such circumstnnccs, thcrc is plenty of timc 
allovxd for cutting down a little of the prairie grass in front, a1~1 
setting fire to it in advance. I f  tlic pass  *is high enough to bum, on 
no pretext should troops enter it until clearcd by thc rockets, 01‘ set 
firc to by your own men. Upon such an occasion, should thc enemy be 
concealcd in tho prairie, thc grass may be set on fire far to w i n d ~ a r d  
Ly the rockets, and thcy would bc placed in n difficult position. That dry 
grass question is n most serious one. I do not Anowmliether in Ashnntcc 
country, thc grass has tlie samc chracter as the prairie in tlicccntrc of 
Africa, but if so, that must be recollected by whoever happens to bc in 
command thcrc, because n short timc bcforc I arrircd a t  Fatiko, there had 
becn a loss of c ~ e r y  one of a slaw trader’s party. The nativcs set firc to 
the grass in onc portion to attract tlic attention of the men. ‘ f i q  \ycrc 
in ambush thcmsclves, and out of 103 men composing tlic slavc Iiunting 
party, not onc man escaped. A t  thc Fame timc that I pckno~rlcdgc thc 
extreme importancc of Halc’s rockets, I must express my astonishmciit 
and disappointment, that projectilcs so admirably adapted by their porta. 
bilityfor savage warfare, should be rcndcrcd almost uscless by thc abscncc 
of explosion. A rockct weighing five pounds (h., thc so-called tlircc- 
pounder) can bc slipped undcr the strap of a soldicr’s knapsack and 
carried with case during n march, so that without extra transport, thc 
projectile is at  immcdiatc hand. It is invaluable when thc troops arc 
making n night attack, for as thcy have to bc under arms a t  midnight, 
nnd to march 12 or 16 miles by daylight, in such circumstances 
it is most cumbersome to employ naticc carriers, and also Tery 
uncertain, bccausc they are extremely Iikcly to bolt. This rocket should 
cxplodc with ~1 bursting charge of an ouncc of strong powclcr. Upon 
bursting, it should scatter incxtinguishablc fire-balls that would burn 
for This arrangement would produce thc ne p l u s  zdfm of 
projectiles for bush-figliting. Two or  thrcc rockets would sufficc to shcll 
out a stockade, as tlic thntchcd liouses would be irnmediatcly ignitcd, 
and the heat mould compcl thc enemy to cvacuate thc position. I 
used Halc’s MCkCtS throughout thc Dari war, but in no instance clicl. 
they ignitc the tliatclied huts. Upon several occnsions tlicy pas.sc(1 
tlirougli the p a s s  roofs, but thc rapidity of tlicir flight did not affor(1 
sufficient timc for ignition, as tlic rocket can only dcpcnct upon its 
ESPERIESCIS IN . SATAGE W.4RFAXE. 
rmnute. 
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905 EXPEMEh’CE I$ SAPAGI: W‘AI:Fc\RC. 
back fire. This i, an important dcfcct that can casilybc rcrne?icd 
by thc application of tlic csplosirc systcni proposed. Field guns \Ti11 
be of littlc scrvicc in the bush, owing to tlic grcat difficulty of trans- 
port. Explosire rockcts would bc much morc scrT-iccable. Thc only 
usc for thc gtins will bc for the defence of stations, wlicrc t h y  \roulc1 
bc uscd with case shot. I liad tcn guns in my latc crpcdition,-rifled 
bronzc barrcls weighing 230 Ibs. each, to carry shell of 84 Ibs. Haring 
no mcans of transport, I fonncl thcm simply n useless incunibrancc in 
marching, and they m-crc quickly conckmned fo inaction in the fort. 
The result of my cxpcricncc mould lcad mc to conrlcnin as uscless for 
the actual bush-march, any other mapons except cxplosirc rockcts, 
powcrful breccli-loading smooth-bores for buckshot, nncl rifles for opcn 
country. There should be anotlicr important adclition to tlic outfit of the 
troops. Ercry man should carry on tlic top of his knapsack, under tlic 
straps, n small but strong arc. This sliould be of a ratlicr soft steel, so 
that it can be easily sliarpencd on n stone or with n file. Hard-tcmpcrcd 
steel will chip, and the nsc will soon bc rcndcrcd iisclcss by the hard 
11-oocls of tropical countrics. Thc succcss of an cxpcdition clcpends in 
n grcnt measurc on tlic health of the troops. Xotliing is so condncire 
to this as the posscssion of n liandy littlc arc bj- each man. When tlic 
halt is soundcd, thc first orclcr s h o ~ l d  bc “ build lints for the night.” 
I n  tho rainy scason, or shoiild tho .rrcatlier be doubtful, it will always 
bc advisable to finish thc day’s journey in ono march. Thus, from 
G A.M. to 11, the mcn will march 14 miles, which is quitc sufficient fbr 
them if they harc to march every d q .  In  an cnemy’s country not 
only hare the men to build huts, but it will be necessary to protect tho 
camp by D strong fcncc of thorns, SO that it cannot bc stormed by n 
sudden rush during the night. Tlic axes at oncc comc into play. The 
sword-bayoncts, kept ire11 sharpened, arc most useful in clearing tho 
high grass from thc ncighhourhood. This scrvcs n doublc purpose,- 
rooB for the lints and bcdcling for thc mcn, mliilc the ground is clcnivd 
for tho sentries. 
3Iy men wcre for the most part blacks; thus they could cndurc 
fntiguc and csposurc that u-ould hnrc bccn trying to Europeans. 
Their kit consistcd of a smrlct flanncl shirt, wliitc Zonare cotton 
trousers, gaitcrs, and sandals. T h y  carried D spare suit in their 
knapsacks, together with D blnnkct, but no grcat coat. KO tents 
wcrc carried on thc march csccpt onc for mysclf, vihicli I abnn- 
doncd for want o f  transport, and contentcd myself with D few Tvatcr- 
proof camp shccts. We thus tnvcllcd in light marching order, 
which I strongly rccommcnd if fighting is contemplated in tlic bush. 
No one can conccirc tlic adrantage of being frcc from the trouble and 
delay of packing hcmy baggngtt when stnrting bcfore dnybrcak. In 
cvcry bush-country, silence must bc rigidly enforced during the march 
in time of mar. A multiplicity of bagpngc is surc to occasion chat- 
tering and noise among thc carriers, which may gim the alarm to tbc 
cnemy when n secret mirch is csscntial to succcss. , Sccrccy and 
rapidity of movement are thc first elements of bush warfare. In thcsc 
qualities the African natircs csccl. It is therefore neccssarq. to cmploy 
spics, and to keep in pay, i f  possible, somc of thosc discontented spirits 
‘ 
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EXI'CIXEKCI: IS. SIVACC \VAEYL\BE, 009 
that arc to bcf-mid in aII couiitries, wIio, Iisring quarrelled with their 
own pcoplc, arc eager to turn against tlieni. Tlicsc meu must keep thc 
conimanding Ofliccr (and l i h  only) informed of thc intentioils and 
inorenicnts of thc enemy. It is essential in all countries in Lush-fight- 
iug to make ccrtain that you can get spies that you can dcpcnd upon, 
because tlicsc pcoplc arc so trcaclierous and so eucecclingly clever that 
they Kill engage as spies but simply to spy yoit, and of course thcy 
lead you into all sorts of difficulties. 
II'licn tlic Khedive's cxpcdition first reached Gondokoro, N. lat. 
4' 5 2 ,  tJic military forcc consistcd of 1,200 men. The troops \I-cre 
occupied in building the station and in erecting iron mapzincs 
for tlic inimmcmblc stores, &c., at tlic timc whca thc Bar1 war 
brokc out. This powerful tribe, having been incited by the slam- 
liuntcrs to rcsist thc Gorernment, commcnccd mar. Tlic country 
rcsemblccl n well-timbered park bordered by tlic rircr Nile, and 
diversified by mountains about eight miles distant. Tlic forests in 
thc neighbourliood irere particularly bcautiful. Tliere xas one forest i n  
which you could ride for about an  hour, composed almost csclusirely of 
magnificent tamarind trees; in fact, nothing can exceed tlic beauty of 
tlic whole country. 
Thc Baris arc n w r y  active and n-arlikc people, numbcring, I should 
imagine, about n million and n half. Although thesc pcoplc had lately 
becn a t  war with n poTverfn1 tiibc about tlircc days' march cast of Gon- 
dokoro, they concludcd'not only peacc, but an alliancc with tlieir latc 
enemies, for tlic express purposc of making a joint attack upon thc 
Government station. A t  that time thc troops n-erc so engaged in 
crecting slielter for themselves and for tlic stores, that no rcgulaT de- 
fence had been commenced. Tho only protection for the station, was 
n fcncc of thorns, simply boughs laid upon tlic ground, one upon the 
othcr wit11 tlic stems inwards. I lind a scpni-atc station a milc and n 
Iialf distant upon tlic bank of thc rircr occupied by thc corps of 48 
Snider rifle,s, whicli formed my body gua~d .  Thcsc men werc selected 
from the txro regiments which formed my forcc, and I had taken much 
pains in teaching them tho usc of tlic rifles. This littlc C O ~ ~ J S  cl'e'lite 
was n great exception, both in disciplinc and intelligence, to the main 
body of tlic expedition, and I OKC not only my success, but thc actual 
existence of our party, to their superior arms and organization. I take 
this opportunity of sayi-itig, I think tliat even among savages, although 
a t  first sou may Lo disappointed by their obtuseness, and in fact 
by tlic extremely low lwcl of their intclligcncc, aftcr a littlc timc, you 
niay hiprove thch ezornle by setting them a high esamplc, and by 
establishing in fact a sort of code of honour, which though a t  first thc;r 
do not understand, yet an esprit tle c o r p  will bc the fa\-ourablc rcsult. 
I picked out these men from tlic 1,200, and if a man shorrcd somo 
inferiority hc was drafted out again and another man substituted. 
If a man was n thief, I used to call tlic mcn togctliei., and not only did 
I punish him, but I gnvc them n lecture upon the disgrace of thieving 
in tlic character of n soldier. A t  last I. cstablishccl such a praise- 
ivortliy cqirit i7c c o r p  among tlicm, that they Would 1invc gone 
through firc and Tratcr for me; and if by vacancy or deatli, it was ncccs- 
YOL. SVII. 3 u  
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0 LO ESPERIEXCE IN SAVAGE TVAXFAXE. 
sary tc-;cpIacc a man, if the cliai-tlctcr of thc man sclccted mas not 
wliolly known as lioncst, the others ~vould not accept liim; they 
say, ‘I He won’t do for us, he will only do for the regiment ; you 
cannot dcpcnd upon him, lie is light-fingcrctl,” and so on. This was a 
most satisfactory result. 
N y  station a t  that time n-as merely n \-cry prctty gnrclcn by the side 
of thc river. I liad 1Lirdly commenced a fort ; but I had a fcm huts 
with my ‘‘ forty tliicvcs,” as I used to call my c o i p  td’e‘lifc in tlie neigh- 
bourhood. No open liostilitics had commcnccd, arid I liad no iden of 
an intended attack. At  about two in the morning, I mas aivakcncd by 
the sound of shots fircd at liead quarters 1+ miles distant. This was 
follomctl by the yells of an untold body of iinti\-cs, wlio Iiad sininl- 
taneonsly attaekcd thc camp. The biiglcs sounded the alarm, and in :L 
short time a licnry file firing told that tlic attack was gcncral. 3ly 
fcm men fell h t o  position, but I could, of course, do no more than 1101d 
my station, momentarily cxpccting an attack upon our weak party. It 
mas a strange thing that the natircs had dcvotcd themselves to the 
attack of tiic chief station pri*isoncd by upwards of 1,100 men, instcad 
of attempting an assault upon my little post, but I suppose thcy iwre 
expecting to  get hold of the ammunition. In about half an liour tlic 
affair mas orcr, and the cncmy was repulsed vith the loss to us of onc 
corporal Lillcd and soinc soldiers moundccl by arrows. In tliis attack 
the nitire scouts had bccn challengccl and fircrl a t  by the scntrics. 
They had thcn used peculiar tactics. At a distance of about half a 
mile tiicy rang bclls, bcat their drums, and blew tlicir largc liorns so 
as to deceive tlie troops, with the idcn that they wcrc a t  n p a t  dis- 
tance from the station; but in reality tlicir main body was stcalthily 
odvancing in the darkness, \vhile the drums and liorns were sounding 
in tlic distance, until they suddenly rushccl unespcctcdly upon thc 
station. The protcction of thorns scrvcd to check the assault until tlic 
heavy f i e  of tlic garrison rcpulscd them. This attack was the signal 
for gcncral liostilitics throughout thc country, ancl I cstablishcd patrols 
by day and night, in addition to the usual scntrics. In  spite of tliis, we 
were subject to continual disturbance ; evcry night the scntrics fircd 
upon scouts who wcrc discovered approaching in thc stealthy manner 
alrady described. I set all hands to ~ o r k  to cntrczlcli tlie camp, ancl 
a t  the same time madc D trian,dar fort at  my private station. Tlic 
ditchcs and carthrrorks ~vere completcd in about thrce II*CC~S, and guiis 
placed upon the bastions. During this time, vie liad bccn as usual 
annoyed by the natircs, iiiorc’ or less, qvery night, until I.armngcd a 
plan mliicli put nstop to tlicir attempts. Tlic plan was simple and rcry 
cffectirc. I posted small parties, consisting of fivc mcii cach, in con- 
venient positions, sucli as bcliind the massive hillocks raised by tlic 
yhite ants, or behind a tliick solitary bush. Tlicsc partics wcrc 
thoroughly concealcd a t  a distance outside the usual bcat of’ the patrol, 
and crcry approach to thc station was thus parclcd. I felt sure that 
the enemy mould fall into the trap, as they mould as usual attcmpt to 
reconnoitre, but would hare no suspicion of such ambuscadcs ontsido 
thc patrol. For this night-work I changcd tlic nrnis, and for thc 
Snidcr riflc, so inr-aluablc by clay, I substitutcd muskcts, with cacli a 
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ESPCIUCSCC IX SAVIGE IVAIX~AIlE~ 91 1 
cnrtridgc of eight hnck shot, imiimccl clomn abovc tlic ball. Nothing 
could hc mom successful. As I liad crpcctcd, tlic nati-ics mmc un- 
awarcs npon thc gnards thus conccalcd. Evcrj  Uight tho positions 
werc changcd, and thus it \\-as impossible for tlic cnciny to line\\: tlic 
points of clangcr. Scrcriil of thcm wcrc shot; onc was cnpturcd aIivc 
and hung on tlic following morning on a. trce as  n warning to thc rest, 
and ina  short timc tlic nights wcrc so cntirclyundisturbcd that not one 
nativc dnrcd visit tlic camp. Tho forts wcrc finished, thc magazines 
mcrc ercctcd, and tho cntiro matciial of tlic cspcdition was under 
shtlter. Thcrc was no possibility of an attack upon so strongly forti- 
fied n position. I accordiugly startcd with n forcc of 4.50 rncn to 
punish thc Bnris who Irad imagined that wc merc afraid to cntcr tlic 
interior. The first point of attack was tho country of Bclinian, about 
Thcsc pcoplc had bccn thc worst among our 
enemies. They had mnrdcrcd sc~-cral scntrics. I n  fact, somc- 
times tltc Baris nppcar to lravc quite :s much cunning and autla- 
citr as Xorth Americaii Indians in stcaliug npon thc sentrics and 
murdering thcm bcforc thcg- had the least idea of tlicir nciglibonr- 
hood. Thc country was cscccdingly beautiful, bciug n mixturc of 
forests, mountains, and plains ; the lattcr being cultivatccl to n Inrgc 
extent with dliurrn (Sorghm z.i!Zgc~rc), whicli g r c ~  t o  tlic height 
of about 9 fcct. Thcrc wcrc fiyc or sir liuudrcd \-illages tlirougliout 
tliis populous country. The iiativcs lind formcrlg- succcccled in ilc- 
stroying somc slayc-liunting parties j thus thcy \\-ere posscsscd of more 
tlian a hundrccl. guns and n considcrablc stock of ammunition. Tltc 
Snidcrs vcry quickly produccd an imprcssion. Tlic nntivcs opcncd firc 
from thcir stockndcs, which wcrc takcn and forced at  tlic bayonet by 
my fxoops with tlic loss of only one man and oiic woman iFoundcd by 
bullcts. It appears cstraordinary that thc momcn should comc into 
nction, but the fact is, that they follon-cd closc up to thc troops witli 
provisions. 
Aftcr a fcw days of sharp cspcricncc, ihc nntivcs took to their 
mountain? and foiwts, in which they conccalcd tlicir cnttlc. I dctcr- 
mined thoroughly t o  explore thc bush, wliiclr, althougli clcnsc in somc 
placcs, would nsually allow an advance in skiirmislting order. I venture 
to snqcs t  that an advance throngh the bush slioulcl bc conductcd bj. 
thrcc lincs of skirrnishcrs, each distant about twcnty yards, whilc tlic 
sbirmislicrs forming the first linc should be only n man's lcugth apart. 
An xdvancc in this open formation viith thrcc companies, d l  co-rcr 
about 200 yards in lcngtli. ,Thc rcar rank forms a protection, whilc 
thc sccond linc will act, as 'support, cithcr for tlic first linc, 01; should 
thc rcar bc nttackccl, they can facc about and support it in turn. I 
snccccdcd cffectually in driring thc enemy from their forest hiding- 
plnccs, au{/in capturing both corn and cnttlc. Tliis was accomplislicrl 
with thc - 0 s  of very fcw mcn on our side. I do not think niorc tliali 
firc or six wcrc killcd j tliis included tlic murclcr of n Turkish 3Iajor 
wlio had bccn through thc Crimcan Wai., but lost his life by losing his 
road through n brcach of disciplinc, ?ud fcll into tlie linnds of tlic cncmy, 
1~110 slion- no nicrcj-. Upon my rcturn to licad-quarters after thirty-two 
days, I found i t  necessary to comnicncc opci.ations on the nest bank of 
3 Q f !  
. twclrc miles distant. 
. 
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912 ESPERIEKCE IN SAI'AGE \VAIGF~I~E. 
tIic river. This was beautiful open ground, and nfforcicd an opportunity 
of trying tlic Arab liorscs, twcnty-onc of \vliich I had brought with mc 
from Cairo. TVlicrcvcr the co~o i t ry  trill adinit of cavalry operations, this 
arm slioiild be employed against sa-iagcs. In the portions of Africa tliat 
I liavc visited, thc natircs liavc an cstraorrlinai*y fear of horses, ~ ~ h i c l i  to 
them arc strange, and supposed to bc dangerous animals. I liavc frc- 
quently chargcd with only four or f i ~ c  horscnicn, captured lierds 
of cattle, and put to flight largc numbers of tlic enemy, whom I Imvc 
held in check nntil thc arrival of thc infantry. Unfortunatcly, I lost 
iic'arly all my liorscs by an cpidcmic, and a t  the close of thc cspcditioii 
only thrce remained. Sucli losses sliould not dctcr cithcr il Govcrn- 
rncnt or a traveller from employing horses. T h y  arc inmluablc, and 
when used up, they will have morc than earned their cost and ,thc 
cspenscs of thcir tinnsport. 
Tlic Dari canipaign that liad bccn carried through on the east 
of the Kile had so far raised the prcstigc of the Snider company, 
that their appcamncc on the wcst was sufficiciit to over-awe 
tlio country mhicli was almost devoid oE forest, and accordingly no 
corcrt existed for the cnciny. For an immcnsc distance, the land- 
scape afforded a perfect field for niilitary opcmtions. Thc pass  
having been fed elosc by innurncrablo cattlc, csliibitcd a clean surfacc 
upon long rolling undulations that drained from the distant mountain 
chain to thc Xlc. Each rarinc betwcen the \varcs of high ground 
was, in the wet season, a roaring torrent, but was, in the d1-y season 
merely n deep bed choked with rocks. Tlic whole of this country was 
thickly populatcd. I advanced south in ciglit >-esscls, thc troops 
mnrching on the banks of tho river. I l i d  only 250 men, as tlic 
Egyptian regiment had rcturncd to Iiliartoum, somc sick, but all dis- 
satisfied qn account of mj- supprcssion of tlie slave trade. The black 
troops iwrc well adnptcd for tlic rough and eonstniit work required. 
Nany of the Officers and mcn had served uncier Bnzainc for somc years 
in Blcsico, and tlicy, and in fact all, wcrc far supcrior in esprit to tlic 
Egyptian Arab regiment. The Snider company liad Iiitlicrto bccn dis- 
tingnislied by scarlct flannel shirts, and so great i n s  their reputation, 
that thc sight of n rcd blousc was cnougli to create dismay among thc 
1i:itivcs. I noiv dressed all my mcn in scarlet and pi-occcdccl to tlic 
south, intending to push on towards tlic Equator to annex tlic coniitry, 
and to purge thc ncw tcrritory from thc slave-liuiiters, wlio Iiumbcrcd 
about 1,100 mcn in tlic soutlicrii districts. Tlicsc tvcrc iiiostly Arabs 
of' thc Soudan, together with 111ai13' black soldiers who liad dcscrtcd 
from thcir rcgimcnts at IChartoum and settled as piixtcu in thc cmploy 
of it firiii (&ad and Co.). This firm cniplojed about 2,500 such 
rnffians as slarc-liuiitcrs in Central Africa. Thcsc nicn w r c  organiscd 
:is iiTcgulai, troops ?rmcd with muskets, rifles, and cloublc-barrelled 
guns, and \vcrc ofliccrcd in imitation of tlic Govcriimcnt rcgimcnts. All 
WCTC I!Johainmedans. Tlic slarc-huntcrs had cndeavourcd to incitc 
tlic natircs against thc Gorernmcnt throughout all tlicsc countries. In  
~ o i n c  they were successful. 
Tliis is thc limit of naviptioii 
on the TTrliite Nile a t  the foot of thc last cataracts. It WIS impossible 
M y  rcssels arrived a t  K. lat. 4' 28'. 
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to mako friends with tlic natives, all of khom were Bnris. A great 
chief pretcndcd friendsliip, but his people attacked the guards at night 
and attempted to carry off tho cattle. Fortunately, I liad taken 
every precaution, and the enemy mas repulsed. It was quite im- 
possible to proceed, as I was without either carriers o r  timsport 
animals. Having a good knowledgc of the country, I left 150 
men in charge of the vessels, and, with a hundred men, I started 
for the country of Loborc': bcyond the Bari frontier. There I pro- 
posed to hire carriers, wlio, with an cscort of troops \\-ould return and 
bring 'up the baggage from. the \-csscIs, which ~voidd then rctnrn to 
Gondokoro. From that point (Iat. 4" 38') the cntire espedition for 
the annexation of Central Africh and the suppression of the slave 
trade would be con~poscd of only 219 picked troops, including Oficers, 
buglcrs, dimmmcrs, &c. I was \re11 aware that, should I mil, I sliould 
be blamed by a11 military autlioritics, as I had a march before me of 
about 3.50 miles without the power of foi-ming posts of communication. 
Thus I sliould bc cut off from nij  base. I knew also th:tt the slnvo 
traders were against us, although a t  that time I did not expect open 
hostilities from them. Bl tlic dcpnrturo of tlic Egyptian regiment, 
my entire force was rcdnced to 31)2 Officers and men. I had there- 
fore to determine upon action with great risks, or  inaction a t  head- 
quarters. Tlic lattcr would havc played tlic gnme of tlic slare-hunters, 
dud tlie cspedition would hare becn n failure. I fully expected that 
after my departure v i th  a hundred men for Loborb, the natires 
would attack tlic Officcr and thc weakcncd detachment in charge of the 
vessels and baggage. I therefore drew the vessels in close line along 
the bank from the mouth of a broad and deep but dry ravine, which 
ran at riglit angles with the river. Thc south flank was thus protected; 
tlie west was tlic broad Nile (about 400 p d s  in n+lth). We were 
only exposed on two points-the east face .and tlie north flank. I 
placed a six-pounder gun in positiou on thc east face, which commanded 
cvcry approach, as the couutry, though nndulating, mas perfectly clear. 
Jly instructions before leaving the Otticer in command xerc as follows : 
at sunset, all cattle (about 2,000) to be securcd in the bottom of the 
ravine close to tlic river. A sergeant's party to line each sido of tlic 
rayine as cattle guards. These men would in case of an attack on tlie 
east face enfilade the enemy, who mould be esposed to a cross-fire in 
addition to that of thc gun. Thc gun to bc loaded at sunset with a 
canister containing 250 musket balls. The tube to be placed in tho 
r en t  xith the I anprd  attached. The gun to be sighted for 200 yards, 
and to be covered with B raw hide to protect it from the heavy dew. I 
served out some new English tubes, as those supplied by the Egyptian 
Government mere very uncertain. I left all vessels and men with tlic 
above precautions. 
Xany people may imnginc from what I hare done, that tlierc 
conld bc no great difficulty Kith tlie natives; bnt unfortnnately I 
liavc always found that whenever I hare seut an Officer in command 
of troops with certain orders, they invariably iiiet with calamity, if 
not defeat, tlirougli tlic carelessness of tlic Olliccr in commalid. I 
reached Lobor6 in four clajs, throligll n most popnlous Countrj, 
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9 14 ESPERIEXCE Ih' SAVAGE WARFARE.. 
without firing R shot. I engaged 500 carriers which I sent to 
the resscls witli an escort of 50 men. In thc nieantimc n general 
attack in grcat forcc 1:ad bcen made upon tlic rcsscls. It was a rulc 
witliont csception, that if I left mi Officer with n certain duty to 
perform, it was neglected. ' Tlic sciitiics werc for the most part aslccp. 
The gun  as not cwn loadcd. The good English tubes liad bccn put 
away so carcfully that t h y  could not be fonnd. Tlic natircs attackcd 
in thc dead of niglit. They surpriscil and drovc in tlic guard upon tho 
cast fqcc, d i n  took refuge in tlic vesscls. Tlic artillcrImcn dcscqtcd 
thc unloaded gun. One man was killcd iipon his piccc in his vain 
attenipt to load it. Fire 
was tliromi into tlic rcssels. The six-pounder gun ,was actually in 
tlie liands of tlic cncmy, but thcy did not know how to carry it off.  
'This attack m-onld liarc cndcd in tlic dcstruction of thc party and tho 
vcsscls and material lind i t  not been for thc flanking firc from thc cattlc 
guard: posted along the cdgc of tlic ravine. This ercated confusion, 
and killed and n-oundcd many of the attacking pnrtp. The soldicrs in 
tlic ressels having recorered from tlieir first surprisc, pourcd a licaq- firc 
into tlic front and took thc gun. Thc artillerjmcn in thcir haste loadcd 
tlic gun with slicll instead of canistci, and cmn tlicu tliey could not 
firc it, as tubc afier tubc failed, in tlic nbscncc of thc goo? Woolwicli 
tubes. Howcrer, after all this disgraccful mismanagement, thc cncmy 
mcro repulsed. This little incident servcs to show horn mucli depcncls 
npon thc Officer in command, crcn when regular troops arc opposed 
to samges. Tlierc is no quarter given in such rmrfarc. d victory 
gaincd by thc savagcs implies thc massacrc of cvery one of their oppo- 
nents.. 
N y  men arrived safely a t  Lobork, numbering 212, including 
Oficcrs. Thc vcssels rctuimcd to Gondokoro. 'We wcrc now fairly 
started, and rrerc out of thc.Bari country. Every native was a friend, 
as I was well known to tlicm 011 my formcr visit. 1 arrired a t  Fatiko, 
N. lat. 3"01', a distancc by route of 1G1 iniles from Gondokoro. No 
onc can concciro a more beautiful country. Tlic climatc is compara- 
t i d y  cool. Tlic mean altitndo of the land is 4,000 feet aborc thc sca 
lcrcl, and the Jandscnpc is a rast park laid out by nature with n com- 
bination of rocky hills, magnificent timber, fertile vallcps, clear streams 
nercr more than a milc apnrt, rippling ovci' the acacia sliadcd rocks, 
and distant mountains closing in thc horizon. I n  this paradise thc 
slavc-liuntcrs liad establishcd tho most pcrfcct hcll. Tlicy not only 
occnpicd Fatiko by a lnrgc station, but .  thcy posscsscd n chain of four 
wcll-choscn positions, each about 22 miles apart, which, being gar- 
risoned by about 1,100 men, dominated thc cntirc country. Now tliesc 
peoplc ivhcncvcr tlicp attack n conntrj, always do it by trcaclicry. 
Tlicr arc gcncrally vicll rcceivcd by thc iiativcs, wlio make thcni 
prcscnts of cattlc, and crcn of young girls, &c. ; but aftcr tlicy hnvo 
establislied tliorough confidcncc, tlicy will get up at miclniglit and niakc 
n treacherous attack npon tlic villagcs; they set firc to ercrjtliing, 
mnrilcr all tlic old worncn-(bcc:tusc, being old, thcy arc impossiblc to 
sell in that countrr)-likcwisc tlic suiall children, and in this way they 
utterly destroy n bcaytifd country. 
A woman I\-as killcd in n boat by a spear. 
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EXPERIENCE IN SAVAGE TYARFAEE. 915 
* I ivas fell known to tho natives of Fatiko in my former journey. 
Thc cliicfs quickly asscmblcd and claimed tlic protcctioll of thc 
Government, declared thcir allegiance, and recounted thc horrors 
and reckIcss massacres committcd by thc slam-hunters throughout 
thc country. I at  oucc gavc thcm protection; and as Goycrnor- 
Gcncral of tho country, I ga1-c the slaw-liuntcrs writtcli noticc 
to  lenrc the country and to rciurn to Khartoum by a given time. 
At thc same timc I uffcrcd them thc option of enlisting in tlic Govern- 
ment scr-iico to form an irregular corps. I Icft at  Fatiko n dctachmcnt 
of 100 rncn with tlic 11cavy baggagc, and tlic greater portion of thc 
ammunition under the command of a major, and started wit11 112 men 
for thc capital of Unyoro (IIasincli), n clistancc of. 1GO miles south of 
Z’atiko, mithiii a long day’s march of thc east bank of the Albert 
Xyanza. It is impossible to scc tlic Albcrt Npnza  from that position, 
but with a tclescopc you cnn see tlic iratcrfdls pouring down from 
the mountains on tlic lake, tlicrcforc I concluded thc west sliorc 
WIS about 50 miles distant. In  the short spncc of a lecture on 
‘‘ Expcricncc in S a y :  Warfare," I cannot T-cnturc into thc dctails 
of tlic intrigues and difficultics which tcrminatcd in n rnpturc with 
the King of Unyoro. I liad hoisted tlic Ottoman flag, nncl formally 
anncxcd thc country, with tlic understanding t h t  the King u-as to 
represent thc Governnicnt. TVc wcrc appnrcntly thc best friends, and 
hc bcggcd mc to send to Fatiko to recall thc officer in command 
togctlicr mitli all troops and material, so as to  conccntixtc my forcc at 
his capital, Masindi (N. lat. 1” 45’). With the trcncliery iisnal among 
liis racc, lie had laid a clccp plan to massacrc the wholc party, and to 
posscss himself of tlic arms and ammunition, together with all tho 
effects of tlic cspcrlition. I wislied to concciitratc my forcc at  Jfasindi, 
believing in tlic goocl faith of tlic King and his pcoplc. I thereforc 
sent a scrgeant an~l tcn rncn with lcttcrs, together with tmcnty-fim rncn 
who had cnlistcd as irregulars, thus forming an armed party of thirty- 
six mcu, accompanicd by thrcc hundred natires as carricrs, N ~ O  iwrc 
to courcy tlic effects from Fatiko, in clinrgc of Major Abdullnh and his 
detachment of 100 men. Hc was nn Officer diem I trusted, as hc had 
been in BIexico under Bazainc for somc’ycars. In reality it was in- 
tcndcd that thc SO0 natires wcrc to carry thc effects and to gain thc 
confidence of tlic troops; but when near Uiiyoro, tlic unsuspecting 
soldiers \verc to be murdcrcd mhilc asleep. In tlic meantime, I and my 
little forcc of 100 men ~ c r c  to bc poisoned and got rid of as speedily 
as possiblc. JIy nicn left v-itli thc post for  Fatiko on 23rd Nay, 1872. 
Altliough tlic riativcs of Unj-or0 arc inferior to thc Baris as warriors, 
t h c j  arc far more dangcrous, as that cxtcnsirc country is thoroiighly 
orpnized. Thc King has a large body of troops continually about 
him, including n body guard of about fifty rncn nrmcd with mnskcts. 
El-cry district is under tlic government of n Chief, mho is personally 
responsible for tlic acts of liis people, a11 of vAom must rwh to arms 
npon tlic beating of his war-drum. Thus, in case of irar, cvcry Cliicf 
of n district arrivcs a t  the liead-qnartcrs with an army, 311 army 
called suddenly by the war-drum, and it is most extraordinary to 
scc the eelcrity with wliicli tlicse pcoplc collect. Thus it would bc 
I 
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916 ESPERIENCE IN SAVAGE WARFARE. 
ixr lossiblc to guess crcn tlic approximate numbcr of warriors tlmt 
could be raised in Unyoro at thc King's command. Thc crtcnt of 
Unyoro is about 1 G O  gcogrnpliical miles in length and '70 in width. 
Somc natives arc armed wit11 bows and poisoned arrows, S O ~ C  wit11 
spears, and n fcw with guns. 
After tlic rlcparturc of niy nicn for Fatiko n cliangc in the 
manncr of the King and sonic of his principal Cliicfs dctcrrnincil 
mc to build n small fort for thc protection of my ammunition, 
&c., in cnsc of need. My mcn worked vith great alacrity, and as 
the timber was closc nt liand I completed in x fcm days a circular 
stockado of thick trunks of trees buried 22 fcct in tlic ground. It 
was my intentiou to surround this wit11 n clccp ditch, thc cart11 of wllich, 
thrown against thc stockade, 15-ould liavc rcndcrcd tlio crcvices ball- 
proof. I belicvc tlic crcction of this littlc fort linstencd thc attack, 
as thc guilty IGng suspected t l in t  I liad gained information of his 
trcncliery. Thcrc w r c  about 8,000 armed men in BIasindi, but few 
womeii. Thc abscncc of womcn is a sign of distrust and suspicion in 
snvngc countries. If you go to any country and thc women and 
children come to scc xou, or arc seen running about without any SUS- 
picion, thcrc is no fear of hostility; but if you do not ECC thc women, 
you may dcpcnd upon tlic ixccssity for kccping x strict guard. The 
capital town, Nnsindi, consisted of several thousand Iiouscs, built, as is 
usual in tliat'country, of cams and straw, resembling hngc bee-liircs. 
3Iy station was adjoining tlic town, cntcrcd by n broad grnrcllcd ap- 
proach, liko n carriagc drirc. On thc ercning of tlic 7th June, nn 
attcmpt was made to poison ~nyself and thc troops. Ii, had been the 
custom of tlic King on many occasions to  present me with plantain 
cider in largc quantities. On this occasion scvcn jars were brouglit, 
fivc of which mcrc scrvcd out. Tlic forcc of tlic poison n-as so immc- 
diatc, that a warning mas 41-cn to tlic men bcforc all had timc to 
drink, for about forty vicrc in x statc of delirium and insensibility. I 
administcrcd strong emetics and shut lip tlic sick within thc fort. I 
turnecl oiit tlic remaining sixty men, wlio kept guard throughout tlic 
night. On tlic following morning, :it 5 o'clock, I inspected tlic sick 
within tlic fort; they \wrc much bcttci; and I sent tliem to tlieir 
quarters. I sent n Licutcnant and a corpoid to beg thc Slicik to CONC 
and esaminc tlic cider that  remained in  tlic jars. Tlic Slieik's house 
was about 200 yards distant. I was walking up and down tlic approach 
smoking n pipe and expecting tlic return of illy mcsscngers. A bugler 
nntl a sergeant mcrc behind mc ; tliick castor-oil shrubs bordered cither 
side of tlic npproacli. Suddenly-I was startlcd by tlic s a r q c  Fells of 
cronds in tlic direction taken by my mcsscngers, and two riflc shots in 
quick sueccssion wcrc thc reply. Tlic bugler, by my or(Icr, somided the 
alarm. A t  thc same moment n h o t  firc opcned npon mc and upon tlic 
Goocrnmcnt Housc from slinrpshootcrs concealed in the castor-oil slirubs 
within n few fcct of mc. Tlic scrgeant a t  niy side fcll shot tli~017gli thc 
heart, another man quickly fcll shot through thc lungs, and anotlicr 
was shot through tlic leg. Tlic firc bcing crcccdingly hot, was replied 
to with wry great alacrity by tlic troops. The men had had so inucli 
fighting for somc years tlint tlicy could bc thoroughly dcpendcd upon, 
. 
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ESPEItIESCE IN SIV-iGE W.\RFJRE, 917 
and tlic 1 tomcnt tlicy licard the bugle tlicy fornicd n squarc, in rcry 
opcn orctc,i suffieicnt to protect n coup~c of acres of ground. It was 
done instantly; but had not tho buglcr bccii at liand, we sliould have 
bccn ovcrwhclmcd, for liarilly had I my rifle in niy hand and my belt 
fastcned, wlien thcrc was a rush of about 8,000 mcii upon thc station. 
Tvlicn that first rush was iiiadc, it was c+traordinai*y to FCC how im- 
possible it nppcnrccl for natives in inasscs to produce any effcct ngninst 
Snider rifles. They ITCI*C cut down in tlic high gmss in all dircctioiis. 
Onc tliing diicli is vcry necessni-y in African warfare or trrclliiig, 
and I think in tlic Ashantee war me ought to liave them, is a good supply 
of bluc lights (capped bluc lights), that you cm immcdiatcly strike 
upon tlie butt cnd of your gnn. Luckily for me I liad plenty, and 
the first ordcr I p r e  was for two partics to admncc on cncli flank to 
set firc to tlic town to the \might and left uiidcr tlic pi.oi-cction of thc 
Snidcrs. A bluc light will sct fire to n grass liut in an instant, but n 
liut is n rcry difficult tliing to sct iire to mitli n firc-stick ; yon 
liavc to blow tlie firc witli a bit of grass on tlic top, and mean\rliilc you 
may liave a lancc or n bullet tlirougli you. Ttiesc two partics with 
blue lights sct firc to tlie town to the right antl left; n strong brcczc 
luckily mas blowing from us, aiid in a few minutes tlicre. was n 
roaring sheet of firc. This pi-otcctcd hot11 our flanks ; so I inimedintcly 
p s c  an order to tlic siitccn Snidcrs to admncc into tlic heart of tho 
town, protcctcd by tlie fire on tlie flauks nccompaiiiccl by mcn with bluc 
lights, who fired wcry lionic as they passcd. Tlierc \verc not more 
than 100 of my men, and thcrc mere ccrtninly 7,000 or S,OOO of tlic 
natives, about 50 armed witli guns, and all organized to n certain cxtcnt 
by having a Chicf to each regiment ; but in tlic course of an hour and 
n half, not only \\'as tlie enemy entirely defeated mitli grent loss, lint 
ovcry single liousc was destroyed by fire, and the battle T T ~ S  won. 
This was n vcry awk\var$ position, which all niilitary men x-ill ap- 
prcciatc. I had alrcacly sciit 
300 carriers to Fatiko who I knew werc traitors. Xox- thc rcil was 
lifted, and these 300 mcn xrould niurdcr my 100 inen that I Iind 
written for ; tliercforc I sliould lose niy little forcc with thc mhole of 
m y  ammunition, and in fact it would be utter destruction. Nobody 
knew the Kay-there was uo road-thc country wns corcrcd with forcst 
and p s s  jungle; it was tlic middlc of tho rainy season, and in fact 
it was tlic most difficult tinic that I cvcr liad erpcrienccd. I kiicw 
perfectly 11-cll Ivhnt to do, but the great difficulty  as, liow to do it. 
I had n mass of luggage of all sorts without one man to carry it ; I 
had a quantity of ammunition, but who was to niow i t ?  Ercry 
day's delay would raise additional tlionsancls against us, nnd I kncw that 
the Iiing,-ivlio had run away at tlic coinmcnccmcnt of tlic figlit,- 
mould stop the road, and orders irould be scnt immedintcly, so tliat we 
slioulrl have to figlit erery inch of our maywitli only onc hiindrcrl nicii, 
carrying loads tlirongli this infernal jungle. Howcrcr, I mndc np my 
mind, antl called my mcii togetlicr. N o w  tlicsc fellows wlio vierc SO 
nndiscip~ined at  first, had really become so thoroughly discipkiecl 1 ) ~ -  
tlic csamplc of the Snider corps, tlint it was only ncccssn1.y for mc to 
gire an orclcr-they placed snch cntirc confidcncc in me aftcr Iinving 
I mas 530 niilcs from licad-qnartcrs. 
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018 EXPERIESCE 1R SAVAGE WACFARE. 
gone through so many dificultics with me aud having got out of those 
diffid !tics iritli so Iittlc loss, that i t  \vas only ncccssary to b- WFC an order 
ancl they instantly obcycd it. I called the men together and spoke to 
them. I said, (' IVC arc in n dilcmma, but yon havc oftcn been in dilcm- 
" mas with nic, and we have al-mys got out. Kom is the timc for you 
" to show whether you arc rncn or not. It ivas only a day or two ago 
" in the battlc of Nasindi that you, onc Imndred, bent something like 
" eight thousand. Yon will 
hare to march through grass that wc came through some months 
ago,nom it is ten fcct high, but then it was only up to your breast, 
" and you will have to fight ercry inch of tlic road. Ercry man mill 
" carry D load; wo must liavc mcrcliandisc to pay our imy with 
" when we nrrivc a t  thc river." You must ham moncy of some sort in 
Africa. I armngcd thc rnarcli in this may.' Tkc arlvancc p a r d  mas 
Icd by D most cxcellcnt Oflicci; Coloncl Abd-eI-Kadir, with sixteen 
Snidcrs; thcy carried no luggagc, and hc, of coursc, had a bugler. I 
came next, in c h q c  of all thc ammunition, d h  Licntcnant J. A. 
Bnkcr, R.N., hnd Lady Baker close bcliinrl mc and my servants, and 
ten Snidcrs and n bugler. Tlic rear guard ivas commandcd by n 
Captain with 1 G  Snidcrs, all admirablc men, and the few Snidcrs that 
were left afterwards mcrc interspcrsed along the linc armed only with 
innskcts. I mnde.an arrangcmcnt with my mcn, "In casc you aro 
" attacked by an ambush on both sidcs of thc linc, cvcry alternate man 
'' is to facc riglit and left," so that thcy could open R line of firc to 
riglit and lcft immediately. Tlic rncn mere n little ncn-ous tlic first 
tmo daj-s, and t h y  had r c n ~ o n  to bc. We wcrc attacked bj- cnormous 
forces, and how it was that thcy did not orcrwliclrn us I cannot tell, 
cxccpt that thcywcm so thick togctlier tliat the bnllcts must hare taken 
friglitful effect in tlic high grass. BIoreovcr, thcrcliappencd to be some 
doublc-barrcllcd 2Jreecli-loading clcphant rilles which carried ciglit 
drnchms of powder ancl a picratc of potash shell, which would lcave very 
little of n mau if it csplodcd on him. It also madc a hideous noise, the 
report of thc slicll being rather more than tho report of n rifle. I 
always noticed in n hot attack when thc lnnccs wcrc flying about in 
the most uaplcasant manncr, that mhcnex-cr these picrntc of potash 
sliclls were fired, somc great effect i ras produced. We had to fight in 
this way, marching 14, 1 G  or 10 miles a day, somctirnes through 
s\vanips, alv;a~s through this fearful grass. IVc had to fight for scvcn 
clays from morning to  night, nerer sccing thc ciicmy, but all through 
ambuscidcs. The difficulty was to convey the rrounclcd. Thcre mere 
only two Iiorscs, which were londcd like camels with luggage. Ny wife 
Iind to march on foot during the mholc of tlic work. Thcrc was only 
one donkey which \\-as n spnrc animal, he was carrying n woundcd man, 
ancl still I am happj- to s5,y I got through and nercr lcft onc wounded 
man in the hands of the cncmy. I am quitc sure if it had not bccn 
for tTic discipline of those troops, no forcc of tliat small number could 
possibly have got through; but thcy observed n most admirablc 
discipline from the cornniciiceniciit of thc march to tlic cnd. Although 
it was impossible to  see more tlian firc rncn in front and an equal 
numhr  bchind, on account of tlic high grass, still of course n-c Iic11t 
Now you will haw to fight cvcry day. 
LC 
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ESPEEIEXCE IN SAVACE  FARE. 919 
iip commnnicdtion by bugles. If it had not bcclr for tllc,bugie it1 tho 
rear whiC;J 1 always sounded “halt” mheii a man was \rounded or 
pcrhps  SO c moman mas tirccl or had to shift load, our line would 
11arc been cut, and if SO, tlicre wonld hnvc been nu cnd to cvcrything. 
At  all cvcnts I got my men through. I made an alliancc with a rery 
powerful chief and Icft sixty men with him. Ho quickly drovc thc 
d io lc  of the enemy out of the country. Thc Sheik R i o n p  now reigns 
as repcscntatiqc of thc Gorcrnment. 
I was anxious to find out where tlic unfortunatc Uajor  Abdullali, with 
his hnndrcci men r h o  mere to have been massacrcd in the grass, mere, 
nhd I determined to take my ‘‘ forty thieves ” and to leave tho sixty mcn 
irith my new ally. I determined thcrcfore immediately to pus11 back to 
Fatiko, and scc what had become of 3lajor Abdullah and my detach- 
ment. Tstartcd, and having crossed thc Nile, I met men who had bccn 
sent by the chief of thc country to impIorcmc to comeimmcdiatcly, for 
tlic mholc of tlic slnre-ti-;lders had intrigued against me. They liad licnrd 
that I had been massacrcd. These slare-traders therefore intcuded to 
collect together to attack thc hundred men under ?&$or Abdullah, to 
massacre them, to take all tho ammunition and effects, and to spread 
the  reports (diicli came to England) that we werc “akeady murdcrcd 
“by tlic natives.” Wc marched as fast as pie could, and passed through 
78 miles of wildcrness. When I nrri-redmitlfin tcnmiles of my station 
in this lovcly paladisc, Fatiko, I came to ri rillagc where the natives 
l i d  collcctcd, ha\-ing heard of my intended arrival. The chicfs 
laid their CRSC bcforc me. The7 said, “If you are a Gorcrnmcnt 
’‘ why do not 1011 protect us. You offcrcd 11s protcction, and 
“ wc have sworn allcgiancc, but -you hare only left onc hundrcd 
‘‘ men to rcprcscnt you, and 1%-e arc pillagcd and murdered by 1,100. 
“ Now we beliere in you still, but show us your power to protcct 
‘‘ us.” On the following morning I startcd ~arly, and when I ar- 
rived at  Fatiko I i r a s  like one risen from the dead. I found tlic de- 
tachment tlierc ; for the King’s nrrangcment to murder them had 
failed ; they had only Billed eleven of my men on tlic march. Instead 
of keeping quiet and carrj-ing out thc King’s orders, they got into a 
squabble n-ith my men, and thc plot broke down before thc appointcd 
timc. I found thc major with his dctaclimcnt and all tlic m a f b i e l  
quite safe. NO sooner had m e  embraced, than n withering volley mas 
opencd upon US from these scoundrels of slavc-traders, who were in 
camp 270 strong, no mow than 90 yards distant. Seven nicn wcrc 
knockcd down immcdiatcly, and wc should h a ~ c  lost n largc number, 
as tlic men, being drcsscd in scarlet, wcrc n fair mark, and closcly 
packed together. However, my “ forty thieves” were not pleasant pcoplc 
to fidit with; and tlic instant tlic attack commenced, it xas  only 
iicct aary to sound the advance with the bayonct, whcn tlic forty, 
leading thc charge, broke up tlic 270 rebels, and in fact crushed 
tlicm at once. In  rebellions, I do not like Iianging pcoplc aftcr 
the fight is orcr;  but at the same timc, whcn troops am called out to 
act, I think it is as ~ c l l  to let them act tlioronglily, and not to sound 
tlic 1)uglc to ‘‘ cease firing ” until n severe lessonlias been given. I was 
detcrmined, as this rcbcllion had commenced, that the bugle should be 
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perfcctly 7ilent until 1 sliould sound “tho asscmblF,” and tlicrcforc tho 
fight con inucd. Out of 270, 141 merc Icft dead upon the field, and 4 3  
merc captured as prisoncrs, 30G cattlc mcrc taken, and n riumbcr of 
donkeys, tlic latter bcing n most raluablc prizc. This was n Ye1-y fortunate 
affair, bemusc it almost tcrminatcd the espedition. It raised tho 
Government troops in the eyes of thc natives, and drew them townrds 
the Govcrnment a t  oncc; and from that moment I really had very 
little difficulty. If I had wanted 50,000 men I only had to hold up iny 
hand. I arrangcd with  tlicm that they should not attack tho other 
slnvc-traders, but I so managed that I formed an irregular corps of 
,300 of the bcst of tlicse people, and drove the rebels cntircly out of 
the country. Some of the slavcr cliicfs wcrc shot during tliat action, 
and altogether it mas nvictory, not only pliysical but moral. The 
mhole country was a t  peace, and thc delightful reward was, tliat after 
so many diGcultics, it v a s  not only peace, but perfect prosperity. I 
established a corn tax, and the natives paid it with tlic greatest good 
mill. 
To sliow the difference of command, I liad sent for reinforcements to 
Gondokoro, 160 miles distant. 300 men were coming up to me as rein- 
forcements through n country whicli I had passed through mitliout firing 
R sbot. The l i l o d c  of my men mas perfect, but tlicsc 300 ncm men, 
during their march with an Egyptian Colonel, actually got into n row 
mitli the natives on tlic road, wcrc defeatcd, and lost thirty men killed, 
and all their aims and ammunition taken ; tlius all tlic good work 
that I ]lad done, ’appcarcd to bc destroyit. T h e n  I returned, I fullx 
expected to have had io fight my way back; but thc natives ncver 
nttzcked me. I marched through tho country, as T would march 
through London, in fact without being jostled. 
Throughout the late expedition I hsvc been ably assisted by Lient. 
3. A. Baker, R.N., who lias upon all occasions uplicld thc rcputation 
of .the noble scrcicc to which hc belongs. 
Yom Royal Highncss, I have already trespassed too much npon thc 
tinic usually pcrmittcd, but having gircn this simple and short 
description of some incidcnts that hare happened, believc me, I do i t  
~ i t h o u t  thc slightcst presumption, trusting tliat out of so much de‘bris 
of matter, those ~r l io  arc practical, and belong to tlic military profes- 
sion, may perhaps find one or two grains worth collccting. 
The CIIAIBXAS : Sir Samucl Baker and gentlemen, I am sure that ‘I am 
expressing tlic sentiments of tl&i largo and important mecting when I 
say, that we highly nppreciatc the very able manner in which yon hare 
brought to our noticc in n very short period so ninny interesting 
details in connection with thc duties upon which sou hare been cn- 
gaged. Therc is nobody iii this room, thcrc is nobody in this country 
who ‘ces not rcjoicc to see you amongst us oncc ngain, and able to 
give is an account of tlic very cstraordinary pomer mliicli one man 
has had over sucli vast 1iorclcs, all of rhom,  as far as I can make out, 
were originally disposed to take anything but n farourable view of 
tlic leader sent amongst them. Now, gentlcmcn, tlicre is onc point 
in all this which I think gives us ‘great hopes for the future. Wc 
Iiavc dmlt to-day ciitirely with the grcat undertaking which you, 
When I Icft, they mcrc cultivating an immense country. 
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Sir Samuel Baker, linvc brought to so successful an issuc; but we 
cannot divcst our minds of tlic fact, that wc arc a t  this moment 
cngagc,\ in sonic serious difficulties somewlint similar to those wliicli 
you have just described. We know what one Englishman has donc 
under tliosc circumstances. I think we may linvc confidencc that 
uot only one, but inany Englishmen, mill endeavour as far as 
possible to emulate tlic doings of our distinguished traveller. This 
gircs mc confidcnce that we shall not linvc to deplore anything in 
tlic shapc of failure. On the contrary, I look liopcfully to tlic future ; 
and although no doubt thc difficulties we have to contend with arc 
great, I am satisfied that we hare had in our dax and in our history 
many such difficulties that Englishmen hnvc orercome, and I beliere 
the Staff, the individual English Officer and the Englisli soldier arc 
quitc What 11-c 
linve heard to-day satisfies mc that tliat will be the result. I think we 
ouglit to  ha\-e implicit confidence in tliosc' who scrw us in n r i o u s  
pnrts of tlic world. We know vha t  has been donc in India, and what 
an  empire wc liarc founded tlicrc. Why should we be afraid that \re 
cannot do  no^^ \\-hat history tells us 11-c hnvc donc bcforc? Prompted 
by that spirit of enterprise, by that spirit of lioncsty and stmiglitforward- 
uess wliich has cliaractcrised youi' proceedings, I am surc that tLc 
Govcrnmcnt of this conntry will bc able to bring to n satisfactory issne 
those difficulties in which a t  this moment wc happen to be engaged ; 
I therefore feel most grateful to you for having brought this sub- 
ject so specially to our notice. I only regret that many of the n-duablc 
hints which yon linre been able to instil into the minds of those who 
arc sitting round sou, cannot bc a t  once cai-ri$ to a, distant land, thcrc 
to be made usc of, no doubt wit11 grcat advantage, d i e r e  now they arc 
so much rcquircd. When I say this, it must bc clearly understood 
that I give the fullest credit to those who are on thc spot, and whilst 
I scc what can and has bccii done by so distinguished an individual as 
tlic one wlio is now amongst us, I fecl confident that there are others 
who :ire willing, ready, and quitc equal to follow in his footsteps. 
equal to tlic occasion, as they linvc been before. 
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